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In the United States, electricity law delineates authority across federal and state jurisdictions, yet many essential
electricity system functions are organized at a regional-scale. Seven regional transmission organizations (RTOs)
ensure open access to transmission, manage wholesale electricity markets, and maintain transmission system
reliability. Each RTO has distinct decision-making processes that emerged from political negotiations and
regional contexts. Drawing on participatory governance and institutional design literature, the paper compares
RTOs across governance structures and participatory and power dimensions. This research increases the visibility
of the existing balance of power in RTO governance, assesses the public interest accountability of current designs,
and offers insights for understanding interactive governance in highly technical settings involving new and old
industry actors and a growing number of public and civil society actors. The structures and participation
practices established to enable regulatory restructuring and economic efficiencies are not necessarily suited to
the current challenges of innovating new market, operating, and planning approaches for the future grid.
Identifying barriers to participation, examining how different actors exercise power, and systematically assessing
the rationale and purposes for various design choices can suggest ways to improve governance effectiveness,
legitimacy, or fairness. This assessment suggests several opportunities for strengthening RTO governance.
However, governance design in complex and dynamic systems is an ongoing challenge that will require orga
nizational resilience in response to new challenges and adaptation as energy systems evolve.

1. Introduction
Energy systems around the world are being transformed by market,
policy, and technology changes. Many practitioners and scholars are
calling for a reconfiguration of these complex systems to provide more
resilient, affordable, sustainable, and equitable energy infrastructure.
Within the electricity sector, systems are becoming more interdependent
across regions as well as more distributed with smaller-scale resources
and diverse business models. In the United States, regional transmission
organizations (RTOs1) provide many essential electricity system func
tions at a regional scale defined by technological system boundaries and
spanning multiple political jurisdictions. These organizations do not
own transmission or other system assets, but instead, they coordinate
system planning, transmission operations, and wholesale market design
across numerous electricity sector participants and at the intersection of

state and federal authorities. RTOs are thus both a novel form of energy
system governance and central actors in the contestation over the reli
ance on fossil fuels and the distribution of economic and political power.
In the United States, RTO decision-making processes are increasingly
being challenged by diverse and conflicting stakeholder interests.
Traditional divides between power supplier interests in reliability and
consumer interests in affordability are complicated by new market en
trants offering innovative approaches to grid services, as well as poli
cymakers, advocates, consumers, and service providers seeking
resilience, sustainability, and equity. The governance challenges for
RTOs can be seen in recent conflicts over RTO capacity market design in
the northeastern regions of the United States [1,2], litigation over RTO
rules affecting interstate transmission development [3], efforts to
expand or create new RTOs in the West and Southeast [4–6], action to
reform the governance of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
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following the 2021 winter power crisis [7], and steps by state policy
makers to consider requiring utilities to withdraw from RTOs [8,9]. In
many venues, attention is now focused on whether RTOs can provide
robust governance and decision-making processes.
RTO governance evolved from a history of private utility coordina
tion to advance reliability, but also emerged as part of political
compromise and within broader trends restructuring regulatory prac
tices and expanding the use of participatory governance arrangements
[10,11]. RTOs are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Com
mission (FERC) and designed to conform with governance principles set
out in formal regulatory orders. They depend on the voluntary partici
pation of market participants and interface with state energy policy and
regulation. Within RTOs, stakeholders seek to exert influence over
market rules or planning practices by proposing solutions, exchanging
information, voicing positions and interests, as well as engaging in
learning, bargaining, deliberation, and in many cases voting. Addition
ally, stakeholders may also seek to influence market design or planning
decisions through formal regulatory proceedings at the state or federal
level.
From the perspective of institutional design theory, RTO governance
is an example of interactive governance that spans the responsibilities of
more than one organization and involves multiple and often conflicting
interests and sources of authority [12–14]. This type of governance is
characterized by a shift toward problem-solving among interdependent
actors and a process of ongoing negotiation in response to multiple aims
and authorities [12,14]. This institutional design approach intentionally
differs from traditional technoscientific governance of complex infra
structure. It represents a departure from hierarchical decision-making
that relies heavily on expert administrators and a shift toward broader
and more empowered stakeholder participation.
The rationale for multi-actor governance approaches is seen as both
normative, with the potential to increase legitimacy and deepen civil
society, as well as pragmatic with the ability to improve the quality of
governance decisions [15–18]. Adopting this perspective, RTO gover
nance encompasses the structures, institutional relationships, practices,
and negotiations that lead to collective decisions about market design
and system planning, as well as the translation of those decisions into
public administrative policy through formal regulatory filings and
rulemaking by state and federal regulators. This governance approach
disrupts long-standing institutional relationships in the electricity
sector, challenges norms that view electricity market design as a depo
liticized technical task that does not require public involvement, and
raises critical questions about how those who are affected by RTO de
cisions should participate in making them [19–23]. It also implies that
governance and stakeholder arrangements can and should be designed
for specific intentions such as strengthening legitimacy, improving
effectiveness, increasing efficiency, or advancing equity [24,25]. In
other words, because RTO governance involves multiple and often
conflicting sources of authority, it is important to examine the institu
tional design of RTO decision-making processes.
Institutional design shapes which stakeholders participate, how they
communicate and make collective decisions, and how these decisions
are translated into policy [26,27]. Recent scholarship in the energy
sector highlights both the limits of stakeholder participation for groups
that lack expertise, resources, and existing relationships [28], as well as,
the ability for institutional design to increase the influence of such
stakeholders [29]. Yet, the institutional design of RTO decision-making
processes has received limited research attention. This review article
describes the institutional design of the seven RTOs in the United States
and asks how and to what extent these designs further public interest
accountability? Based on a review of primary documents outlining
structures and practices, we aim to increase the visibility of the existing
balance of power in RTO governance designs, assess variations across
regions, and contribute to the understanding of participatory gover
nance approaches in complex technological settings.
Our review proceeds in the following sections. Section 2 provides

background on RTO governance principles and variations across con
texts. Section 3 draws on institutional design literature to explain the
theoretical concepts that drive our study. Section 4 describes our
research approach and methods. Section 5 presents the results of our
assessment comparing RTOs across four common governance structures
and three participatory and power dimensions. Section 6 discusses the
significance of our review in terms of normative and pragmatic aims of
participatory governance, limitations of our study, and suggestions for
future research connecting governance design to regional variations in
market outcomes such as consumer choice, affordability, environmental
impacts, and resilience. Section 8 presents conclusions.
2. Background and context
This section provides background on the federal guidance shaping
RTO governance and compares the geographic, regulatory, energy
resource, and clean energy policy contexts of the seven RTOs in the
United States: the California Independent System Operator (CAISO),
Electric Reliability Corporation of Texas (ERCOT), Independent System
Operator of New England (ISO-NE), Midcontinent Independent System
Operator (MISO), New York Independent System Operator (NYISO),
PJM Interconnection (PJM) and Southwest Power Pool (SPP).
2.1. RTO governance principles and public interest accountability
Beginning in the mid-1990s, a series of state and federal regulatory
reforms in the United States sought to introduce generation and retail
competition in the electricity sector [30]. To support these efforts, FERC
encouraged the creation of RTOs as voluntary organizations established
by private parties, funded by market users, and regulated as public
utilities [31]. Across the United States, seven RTOs now manage
approximately 70% of the bulk power supply, while large portions of the
West and Southeast do not participate in an RTO and continue to operate
primarily through bilateral wholesale transactions [32]. FERC does not
require a specific RTO institutional design. Instead, it supports regional
differences and the evolution of governance institutions that align with
specific principles and criteria defined through a series of orders
(Table 1). These principles require RTO decision-making processes to be
both independent of and responsive to market participants and stake
holders. The adequacy of these principles for holding RTO decisionmaking process accountable to the public has been a topic of debate
since these governance arrangements were first established and FERC
has acknowledged a “natural tension” between the goals of indepen
dence and responsiveness [20].
2.2. Geographic and regulatory context
The context for RTO governance differs due to regional variations in
geographic scope and regulatory restructuring (Fig. 1 and Table 2). One
of the most obvious differences across RTOs is the number of states
served. CAISO, ERCOT, and NYISO serve three of the most populated
states in the United States. The remaining RTOs operate across multistate regions encompassing a broader range of socio-political contexts
for electricity system decision-making.
Initially, RTOs were established among utilities with a history of
coordination through power pools to achieve operational and planning
efficiencies and in markets seeking to achieve full restructuring of
generation ownership, transmission access, and retail services [10,30].
Four of the five RTOs that formed before 2001 evolved from tight power
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Table 1
Formal RTO governance principles and criteria established through FERC
Orders.
Financial and Political Independence
(Order 888 and Order 2000)

Responsiveness to Customers and Other
Stakeholders (Order 719)

Non-discriminatory. Governance
should be structured in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner.

Inclusiveness. The business practices
and procedures must ensure that any
customer or other stakeholder affected
by the operation of the Commissionapproved independent system operator
or regional transmission organization, or
its representative, is permitted to
communicate the customer’s or other
stakeholder’s views to the independent
system operator’s or regional
transmission organization’s board of
directors.
Fairness in balancing diverse
interests. The business practices and
procedures must ensure that the interests
of customers or other stakeholders are
equitably considered, and that
deliberation and consideration of
Commission-approved independent
system operator’s and regional
transmission organization’s issues are
not dominated by any single stakeholder
category.
Representation of minority positions.
The business practices and procedures
must ensure that, in instances where
stakeholders are not in total agreement
on a particular issue, minority positions
are communicated to the Commissionapproved independent system operator’s
and regional transmission organization’s
board of directors at the same time as
majority positions.
Ongoing responsiveness. The business
practices and procedures must provide
for stakeholder input into the
Commission-approved independent
system operator’s or regional
transmission organization’s decisions as
well as mechanisms to provide feedback
to stakeholders to ensure that
information exchange and
communication continue over time.

Financial Independence. The RTO, its
employees, and any non-stakeholder
directors must not have any financial
interests in market participants.

Political independence. An RTO must
have a decision-making process that is
independent of control by any market
participant or class of participants.

Independent authority. The RTO must
have exclusive and independent
authority to file changes to its
transmission tariff with the
Commission under section 205 of the
Federal Power Act.

Table 2
Regional transmission organization size and origins.

transmission

organizations

in

North

States Served
(all or part)

Size in People
Served
(millions)

Origin

Date of
Market
Operation

CAISO

1a

~32

1998

ERCOT

1b

~ 26

ISO-NE

6

~14.8

MISO

~42

NYISO

15+ one
province
1

PJM

13+ DC

~ 65

SPP

14

~18

State Legislation
(1998)
System
Interconnect
(1941)
Power Pool
(1971)
Not a Power Pool
Legacy
Power Pool
(1965)
Power Pool
(1927)
Power Pool
(1941)

~19.8

2001
1997
2005
1999
1998
2004

Sources: See Appendix A.
a
Single state (~80% of CA and a small part of NV).
b
Single state (~90% of TX; not synchronously interconnected with other
states).

Fig. 2. Share of retail power marketer sales in RTO regions (2019 MWh)a,
b
. a. Totals may not add to 100% due to adjustments. b. Consumer-owned
utilities include cooperative, municipal, political subdivision, state, and fed
eral utilities.
Source: [39]

Sources: [31,33,34].

Fig. 1. Regional
Source: [38]

RTO/
ISO

retail power marketers (Fig. 2).2 In contrast, the Midwest RTOs – MISO
and SPP – became RTOs in the mid-2000s, after the energy crisis of
2000–2001, and as political pressure for regulatory restructuring
diminished. Independent power producer generation is relatively low in
states served by MISO and SPP, except for Illinois [30]. In addition, for
the most part, the states in these regions have not introduced retail
competition. Rather, in most service areas retail electricity continues to
be provided by vertically integrated utilities, with retail power marketer
sales accounting for only 6% of retail electricity sales in MISO and none
of the retail sales in SPP (Fig. 2).
The history of CAISO is distinct. It was established through state
legislation introducing competition in both generation and retail ser
vices. California’s efforts to promote retail competition were halted after
the 2000–2001 energy crisis [35,36]. CAISO now operates in a state with

America.

2

An independent power producer is a corporation, person, agency, authority,
or other legal entity or instrumentality that owns or operates facilities for the
generation of electricity for use primarily by the public, and that is not an
electric utility. Retail power marketers engage in selling electricity directly to
the customer that consumes the energy product [79].

pools and regional interest in market competition. Today these four
RTOs – ERCOT, ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM – represent the regions of the
U.S. with the highest penetration of independent generators [30] and
3
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moderate penetration of independent generation and partial retail
restructuring for residential customers.
Alongside the for-profit utilities participating in RTO markets, public
power utilities and electric cooperatives operate in each RTO region,
with varying degrees of participation in the RTO markets. The share of
retail sales by consumer-owned distribution utilities ranges from 44% in
the SPP region to 8% in the CAISO region (Fig. 2). In 2015, SPP doubled
the size of its footprint and it now includes one of the largest generation
and transmission cooperatives in the country and the first federal power
administration to join an RTO [37].

these governance processes lack open access, fairness, and transparency
[49]. Alongside these outcome considerations, research on RTO gover
nance identifies insufficient public interest accountability as a critical
concern [20,50]. The existing scholarship explores process and
accountability questions regarding board composition and management
[20], the power imbalance among stakeholders and the dominance of
transmission owners [10], the negotiation of authority in forming new
RTO governance arrangements [51], how social norms and values shape
RTO decision-making processes [52], allocation of authority to request
rule changes in formal FERC proceedings [53], state authority in
resource adequacy planning [19], transparency in decision-making and
market monitoring [21], access to decision-making processes [54],
stakeholder voting practices [23], state and federal oversight re
sponsibilities [50], and adequacy of existing governance principles
given market changes [55]. Taken as a whole, this literature recognizes
the complexities of regional governance and democratic accountability
in highly technical policy settings.
Electricity has long been considered an essential service of public
interest that is necessary for community well-being and economic
development [56,57]. Under the Federal Power Act, FERC is responsible
for ensuring wholesale electricity transactions further the public interest
[20]. Yet, how are the administrative decisions of regulators held
accountable to the public? And what does this look like in an interactive
governance design?
Scholarship on governance and institutional design provides a useful
lens to explore RTO governance and public interest accountability. From
a governance perspective, accountability can be furthered through the
independence of expert administrators carrying out their responsibility to
the public and subject to political oversight, through the responsiveness
of experts to public demands and preferences, or a combination of these
approaches [15,58,59]. In complex governance arrangements, like
RTOs, traditional political oversight approaches to accountability are
less effective and characteristics of participatory decision-making pro
cesses become more important [14,60,61].
Complex governance arrangements involving more than one orga
nization are common across many policy arenas and play a major role in
public policy deliberation, decision, and implementation [12,17,61].
These hybrid organizational forms with multiple actors, many sources of
authority, and diverse objectives emerge to address substantive prob
lems that cross jurisdictional, functional, or disciplinary boundaries
[14,17,25]. This type of governance is characterized by a shift toward
problem-solving among interdependent actors and a process of ongoing
negotiation in response to multiple aims and authorities [12,14].
Governance scholarship identifies openness, inclusiveness, and fairness
of process, as well as, interactions with public authorities and civil so
ciety organizations as important for providing public interest account
ability in these settings [14].
A growing body of scholarship provides a structured way of thinking
about the institutional design choices that are important for addressing
interactive governance process challenges and improving outcomes
[17,26,62–64]. This scholarship examines institutional designs as they
exist in practice and demonstrates that “variations in design matter” for
addressing problems of governance [25,65]. In other words, engaging
stakeholders in governance has the potential to increase legitimacy,
efficiency, effectiveness, and justice [14–18,26,61]. For example, the
context, structures, and practices of such arrangements can increase
procedural fairness and access to decision making, strengthen the
knowledge base and enable organizational learning, or shift the balance
of power [25–27]. Yet, these arrangements can also create structural
advantages for industry interests, allow powerful actors to restrict the
scope of decision-making, limit the consideration of alternatives, fail to
achieve balanced discourse, and limit the transparency of decisionmaking [61,64,66,67]. From this perspective, there is no ideal form of
governance or stakeholder participation; rather public decision-makers
can (and should) design participatory governance arrangements to
address particular substantive problems situated in specific contexts

2.3. Low-carbon energy policy and energy resource context
The context for RTO governance also differs across state-level clean
energy policies and the mix of energy resources. Electricity sector
restructuring in the 1990s and 2000s was intertwined with a rapid but
uneven expansion of state-level clean energy policy [40,41]. A com
parison that lists RTOs by share of average annual energy generation for
low-carbon energy resources illustrates two patterns (Table 3). First, the
four regions with the highest share of low-carbon energy generation
have some of the most aggressive state clean or renewable energy pol
icies. These regions, except for CAISO, also have the lowest share of
energy generation from variable renewable resources and depend
heavily on nuclear resources (see also Fig. 3). Second, the three regions
with the lowest share of low-carbon energy generation serve states with
fewer renewable and clean energy policies. Yet, these regions have a
relatively high reliance on variable renewable resources, primarily
wind.
Fig. 3 provides the average annual energy generation mix for each
RTO organized from left to right according to the share from low-carbon
resources, ranging from nearly 60% in CAISO to just over 30% in MISO.
Of all seven RTOs, ISO-NE is most reliant on natural gas with this fuel
source supplying more than 50% of total generation. Generation in
MISO and SPP is characterized by a relatively high reliance on coal
compared to other RTOs. In MISO, coal and natural gas resources ac
count for 70% of total energy generation and make it the RTO with the
highest reliance on fossil fuels.
3. Literature review: RTO governance from an institutional
design perspective
Stakeholders have argued that RTO governance has important im
plications for the public in terms of costs, consumer choices, environ
mental impacts, and innovation, yet many stakeholders also claim that
Table 3
Comparison low-carbon and variable energy generation and state policies.
RTO/
ISO

Avg. Annual LowCarbon Energy
Generation (2020)

Avg. Annual Variable
Energy Generation
(2020)

State Clean or
Renewable Energy
Policiesa

CAISO

63%

26%

NYISO

57%

3%

ISO-NE

47%

6%

PJM
SPP

41%
39%

4%
30%

ERCOT

36%

25%

MISO

32%

12%

CA 100% clean by
2045
NY 100% clean by
2040
6 of 6 states MA
80% clean by 2050
9 of 13 states
2 of 14 states NM
100% clean by 2045
Previous RPS for
2015
4 of 15 states

RPS = renewable portfolio standard; Clean = clean energy standard.
Sources: [42–48].
a
Count of state policies only includes procurement mandates with targets in
2021 or later years. These state policies include many variations that further
affect stringency and many states have other policies that influence investment.
4
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Fig. 3. Energy generation mix by regional transmission organization (2020)a a. CAISO data does not include 21% of generation from net imports. Sour
ces: [43–48]

[27,65,68].
This study adapts conceptualizations of participatory governance
developed by Fung [26] and Newig et al. [27]. These frameworks view
decision-making processes as more or less participatory and collabora
tive and highlight that the extent and form of participation can be a
strategic institutional design choice [26,27,68]. In this regard, these
frameworks are particularly useful for examining governance arrange
ments in contexts, like the energy sector, where the exercise of social and
political power is of relevance.
Fung [26] and Newig et al. [27] conceptualize participatory gover
nance across three dimensions of variance [26,27]. First, participation
varies according to the breadth of actors involved and depends on selec
tion mechanisms that can be open to everyone or intentionally designed
with active or passive recruitment strategies to promote a balanced and
representative group. Second, participation varies across different
communication and collective decision-making approaches that determine
the manner, direction, and intensity of information flows and the
mechanisms for developing collective choices. Common approaches for
developing collective decisions require different levels of investment,
knowledge, and commitment. For example, aggregation and bargaining
are possible when stakeholders know what they want, and participants
work together to seek mutual gains. In this approach, preferences are
aggregated through voting structures or other mechanisms that are often
mediated by the relative influence of participating stakeholders. Alter
native approaches to collective decision-making, include open dialogue
to foster creative and innovative solutions, as well as, deliberation and
negotiation among participants with a common good orientation
seeking to figure out what they want individually and as a group through
reasons, arguments, and principles. Finally, participation varies ac
cording to the shared authority granted to participants as collective de
cisions are translated into administrative policy. This can involve
consultation processes with minimal stakeholder empowerment,
collaborative processes in which stakeholders develop specific advice
and recommendations, or more formal delegations of authority that
empower stakeholders as central actors in making shared decisions.
These conceptual frameworks are widely used and have the potential
to capture the power dynamics in governance designs, but do not engage
directly with the exercise of power and how this may limit public in
terest accountability. To strengthen our assessment of RTO governance,

we combine these frameworks with work on the exercise of power in
collaborative governance. This work is grounded in Lukes’ [70]
conceptualization of power and suggests that attention should also be
paid to participation patterns and access to processes, the ability to
define the scope of decision making, and whether dominant ideas or
values marginalize alternative perspectives [64]. Applying the central
concepts from these frameworks to the practice of governance in the
seven RTOs in the United States, this review article compares important
institutional design features and assesses how and to what extent these
designs further public interest accountability.
4. Methods
A qualitative comparative case study research design is used in this
investigation. Our initial data collection involved a review of secondary
academic and practitioner literature on RTO governance. Our search
yielded an initial set of 38 documents. This literature was used to
develop a research-generated guide to describe important context con
ditions and the governance structures in use across the cases (see
Appendix A). The guide structured extensive primary data collection
and content analysis from organizational agreements, committee char
ters, membership requirements and lists, voting practices, market
monitoring reports, strategic plans, and stakeholder engagement pre
sentations. The collected empirical data is organized within the con
ceptual framework adapted from the institutional design literature
[26,27,64]. The initial assessment was refined by revisiting primary
documents to further delineate specific aspects of institutional design
that relate to the exercise of power in interactive governance and public
interest accountability, including public information sharing, trans
parency of decision making, and interactions with public authorities,
civil society, and environmental organizations.
For the comparative assessment, data on stakeholder counts and
voting weights by sector are organized into seven categories and three
groups. We reviewed sector definitions and information on individual
members in each sector to identify similarities across RTOs and to
identify the sectors that include members with specific public interests,
such as state agencies, consumer advocates, environmental organiza
tions, and cooperative or public power utilities. Based on this review,
each sector is assigned to a category reflecting similar electricity grid
5
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Fig. 4. Governance structures and participation dimensions.

functions, business models, or organizational types. Following empirical
work in [71,72], the categories are then grouped by potential interest
alignment. Based on stakeholder-level data of capacity market voting
patterns in PJM, previous research demonstrates relatively strong in
terest alignment within and across certain sectors and heterogeneity of
interests in other sectors. Recognizing likely differences in interest
alignment across regions and issues, these findings are used to place the
sector categories into three broad groups reflecting interests: i) trans
mission and generation suppliers, ii) alternative resources, power mar
keters, and other suppliers, and iii) power distribution utilities/
marketers and consumers. Appendix B and Fig. 5 show the relationship
between categories and groups. The previous empirical research on
sector interests did not include state agencies and environmental ad
vocates, however, for this study, state agency and environmental in
terests are grouped with consumers.
The initial interpretation of findings was guided by concepts from the
literature. The regional cases were initially grouped according to four
measures the literature suggests are important for public interest
accountability: i) access to decision making venues such as board or
members meetings, ii) ability to define the scope of decision making by
initiating problem statements or rule changes, iii) information sharing
and transparency of decision-making, and iv) the scope of state authority
as an indicator of the extent of interfacing with public authorities. This
grouping of cases revealed additional commonalities and differences
across context and governance dimensions. Finally, the initial findings
were shared with and strengthened through presentation to experts and
practitioners in the field.

processes, most RTOs have a hierarchical committee structure involving
a high-level members committee and standing committees, as well as
subcommittees, workgroups, or task forces organized around substan
tive topics. Each RTO also has a process for interacting with civil society
organizations and state authorities. Important structural differences
across RTOs are summarized in Table 4 (the columns correspond to the
structures identified in the blue boxes in Fig. 4).
5.1.1. Boards
Under FERC guidance, RTO boards can be composed of stakeholders,
independent experts, or a hybrid of both. In practice, six of the seven
RTO boards are considered independent and consist of members that are
unaffiliated with market participants and are not selected to represent
stakeholder positions. ERCOT has been the exception with a hybrid
board of unaffiliated members and a consumer representative and a
representative of the state public utility commission. Board selection
processes vary. Existing board members select new board members in ISONE and NYISO with stakeholder and state input in the nominations
process. RTO members elect new board members in MISO, PJM, and SPP
with existing board members participating in nominations and no
formal role for state authority. State officials create a committee for the
selection of ERCOT board members and stakeholders nominate board
members for CAISO that are subsequently appointed by the Governor of
California.
5.1.2. Members
In decision-making processes, RTOs typically differentiate between
market participants, RTO members, and the broader set of stakeholders.
For example, any interested stakeholder can participate in CAISO
meetings, there are no members, and only market participants pay
administrative fees. However, all other RTOs define specific member
ship categories. Eligible stakeholders that choose to participate in
decision-making pay an annual membership fee and accept an obliga
tion for an exit fee. In return, members receive specific positional au
thority, voting rights, and responsibilities. Each member-based RTOs
has a standing members committee that serves as the highest level in the
stakeholder decision-making process and acts as an interface between
stakeholders and the board.3 Within this context, many market partici
pants are not RTO members and don’t participate in decision-making.

5. Findings
This section presents an overview of common governance structures
found across all seven of the RTOs and describes the basic features of
each structure. It also describes how participation in governance varies
across participatory and power dimensions.
5.1. Common RTO governance structures
Our review identifies four common structures in use across all seven
RTOs in the United States. These structures and their relationship to
three pairs of participatory and power dimensions of governance are
summarized in Fig. 4 with participatory dimensions on the left of the
figure and power dimensions on the right (see example in Appendix C).
All RTOs have a tiered form of governance with a governing board
assigned some level of decision-making authority and with meetings
that involve members in collective decision-making processes to provide
advisory or authoritative recommendations. Within these engagement

3
These structures differ in detail and have different names. For comparison
purposes in this paper, each of the standing committees is referred to as a
members committee. Formal members committee names are as follows: ERCOT
= Technical Advisory Committee; ISO-New England = Participants Committee;
MISO = Advisory Committee; NYISO = Management Committee; PJM =
Members Committee; and SPP = Markets and Operations Policy Committee.
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Fig. 5. Share of members in sector categories by
regional transmission organizationa,b,c,d a. Within the
seven sector categories, individual sectors are identified
as separate segments and by percentage. Blue shades
represent supplier interests. Tan shades represent sectors
with mixed interests. Green shades represent consumer
interests. b. MISO allows members to vote in more than
one sector. c.SPP only uses the full slate of 11 sectors in
the members committee that meets concurrently with the
Board and in the Corporate Governance Committee.
d.
CAISO only uses sectors in the board nomination pro
cess. Sources: Appendix B. (For interpretation of the ref
erences to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)

The ratio of voting-eligible members to the number of market partici
pants ranges from about 20% to 84% with the higher ratios reflecting a
relatively higher level of direct participation and lower reliance on
formal or informal representation by others (Appendix B). Moreover,
within the set of voting-eligible members, the extent to which members
participate in formal voting also varies by region and issue [73].

5.2. Dimensions of participation and power
This section describes how RTO governance varies across participa
tory and power dimensions. It combines concepts from the literature to
compare three pairs of dimensions: i) who participates and how access
differs across participants, ii) how participants define the scope of
decision-making and make collective decisions, and iii) which partici
pants are empowered to translate decisions into public policy and the
norms that shape participation. Results are summarized in Table 5.

5.1.3. Civil society and environmental participation
Opportunities for civil and environmental organizations to partici
pate in stakeholder engagement processes depend on formal member
ship requirements, access provided to meetings and information, and the
ability to garner the resources and technical capacity to join and effec
tively engage in processes. These organizations may or may not be
eligible to join as members and some meetings are open to the public,
but others are not. Of the seven RTOs, civil society and environmental
participation is most restricted in the PJM process, with these interests
represented by a non-voting user group that is limited to putting motions
before committees or the board. In comparison, CAISO allows partici
pation by all organizations or individuals. The other five RTOs include
civil society and environmental organizations in one or more member
ship sectors. MISO is unique in have a separate voting sector for envi
ronmental and other stakeholders.

5.2.1. Participants and access
This section examines the interests that are represented (and those
that are excluded) and draws attention to which participants have access
to decision-making venues, whether the group of participants has the
knowledge to make good judgments, and whether participants are
responsive and accountable to those that do not participate [26,64].
Participants in RTO governance are largely professional stake
holders, representing private, public, or non-profit organizations, rather
than members of the general public. Organizations become RTO par
ticipants by joining or being assigned to a stakeholder sector. The
eligibility requirements for each sector are defined in RTO by-laws or
operating agreements. Sectors are used to organize interests within
members committees, some lower-level committees or groups, and
voting processes. Participation in CAISO is the exception, with no formal
differentiation across participants in discussions to modify rules.
Across the RTOs, the number of eligible voting members ranges from
89 in NYISO to more than 500 in PJM (Appendix A) and each RTO has a
distinct set of sectors (see Appendix B for member counts by sector for
each RTO). To identify and compare the types of interests represented by
RTO participants, the sectors are placed into seven categories reflecting
similar electricity grid functions, business models, or organizational
types and three broad groups reflecting potential similarities in interests
(Fig. 5). The share of transmission and generation interests (in blue
shades) ranges from 48% in MISO to 7% in ISO-NE and reflects the

5.1.4. State authority interface
States have traditionally been responsible for the adequacy of gen
eration, retail rate regulation, and transmission sitting [74]. As RTOs
have evolved the extent of state authority over these issues and the
interplay between market rules and state clean energy policy has varied
by region. The multi-state RTOs each have a body representing state
regulators that provides a venue for states to interact with each other
and with the RTO. The single state RTOs have different institutional
relationships based on state statutes and delegations of authority (see
Section 5.2.3).

7

S. Lenhart and D. Fox

Energy Research & Social Science 83 (2022) 102345

The participant access dimension draws attention to institutional
designs that limit opportunities to engage in certain decision-making
venues, as well as, how differences in resources can affect the ability
to prevail [64]. Most RTOs have board and members committee meet
ings that are publicly noticed and open to public participation. However,
access to participation is restricted in the three northeastern RTOs with
meetings closed, closed to non-members, or limited to separate nondecisional liaison committee meetings (row 4, Table 5). Moreover,
RTO stakeholder engagement processes involve considerable time and a
high level of expertise, with many organizations designating full-time
staff to participate and other organizations strategically determining
when and where to engage (see [52]).

Table 4
Regional transmission organization governance structures.
RTO/
ISO

Board
Membership
and Voting
Rulesa

Members
Committee
Compositionb

Civil Society
Participation

State Authority
Interface

CAISO

5 members/CEO
not on board
Simple majority

No
membership or
committees

Within open
initiatives

ERCOT

11 members
Supermajority
of 2/3 and 50%
of seatedc
10 members
Simple majority

Representative

Within sector

Governor
appointment
and senate
confirmation of
board
PUC and
legislative
oversight

Plenaryd

Within sector
and liaison
group

ISO-NE

MISO

10 members
Simple majority

Representative

Separate
sectors

NYISO

10 members
Approval of 6
members

Plenary

Within sector
and advisory
councils

PJM

10 members
Simple majority
7–10 members
Simple majority
(secret ballot)

Plenary

Non-voting
user group
Separate
sector

SPP

Plenary

5.2.2. Scope and practices for collective decision-making
This section examines the governance structures that shape how
participants interact. It describes how participants communicate, define
the scope of decision-making, share information, and make collective
decisions. These dimensions draw attention to which actors influence
agenda setting and prioritization of issues, as well as, the balance of
power [26,64].
RTO meetings provide an opportunity for participants to share in
formation, express preferences, and in many cases, develop new solu
tions to identified problems with market rules. In the committees of most
RTOs, stakeholders actively draft proposals, develop positions, provide
written and oral comments, and supervise subcommittees. These pro
cesses differ from common public hearing formats in that they are not
formal regulatory proceedings with legal restrictions on communica
tion. Rather, formal and informal communication among stakeholders
and with the RTO staff and board is the norm. Most RTOs require
membership or other standing to propose rule changes, and in two of the
northeastern RTOs, board meeting materials and detailed meeting mi
nutes are not available to members, state authorities, or the public. In
contrast, three RTOs are open to initiatives developed by any stake
holder and in most RTOs agendas, meeting materials, presentations,
written comments, and board voting records are posted publicly. In
some cases, archived webcasts of meetings are available for viewing
(rows 5 and 6, Table 5).
RTO stakeholder meetings serve to translate participant views and
preferences into collective decisions. Communication about proposed
rule changes typically begins in more informal subcommittee, work
group, or task force discussions where decisions are often based on
consensus. Discussion of proposed rule changes then proceeds to
standing committees. In general, RTOs uses sector-weighted voting in
the highest-level members committee and allow parent committees to
determine the voting mechanisms or other decision-making processes in
subcommittees and lower-level venues. PJM has one of the most
formally structured processes with ranking and polling used in lowerlevel venues to drive decisions forward. CAISO uses an iterative pro
cess of revisions guided by staff to make collective decisions. SPP differs
from other RTOs in that before proposals reach the members committee
and board meeting, members are identified as either transmissionowning or transmission-using members and voting weights are allo
cated equally across these two categories.
Voting regimes across RTOs include a diversity of designs for sector
weights and thresholds. A simple comparison of voting weights in RTOs
based on sector categories highlights the institutional design decisions
embedded in these structures (Fig. 7). The weighting of sectors is not
based on the number of members within a sector, but rather reflects
negotiated decisions about the balance of power. For example, in PJM
transmission owners are 3% of the participants and are allocated 20% of
the votes. As another example, in ERCOT end users represent 57% of the
participants and are allocated 20% of the votes. The thresholds for
passing a decision are another important design feature of voting sys
tems. RTO members committees generally require a supermajority to
approve a rule change, with NYISO setting a somewhat lower threshold
of 58% and MISO using a simple majority.

Organization of
regulators and
organization of
policymakers
Organization of
regulators and
policymakers
Non-voting
participation in
board and
committee
meetings
Organization of
regulators
Committee of
regulators

Sources: See Appendix A.
a
RTOs have different titles for the board structure (e.g., board of governors,
board of directors, board of managers). For purposes of comparison, the term
board is used. The CEO is a voting or non-voting member of all boards, except
CAISO.
b
RTOs have different names for the standing committee that serve as the
interface between stakeholders and the board. For purposes of comparison, the
term members committee is used.
c
The composition of the ERCOT board was revised in 2021 through state
legislation. It includes eight independent voting members and three non-voting
members (the CEO, the chair of the public utilities commission, and a repre
sentative of residential and commercial consumers).
d
The ISO-NE stakeholder process is operated within a separate organization,
the New England Power Pool, that pre-dates the RTO but is administratively
supported by ISO staff.

extent of restructuring across the regions. The share of consumer in
terests (in green shades) ranges from 12% in PJM to 83% in ERCOT.
Only two RTOs have separate sectors for public policy, civil society, and
environmental organizations.
Two related issues arise when RTOs use sectors to organize partici
pation. First, sector membership often includes a diversity of interests
within the sector. The end user’s sector is an example of interest diversity
within a sector (Fig. 6). In some RTOs, the end-use sector strictly rep
resents large industrial or commercial users. In other RTOs, these
stakeholders are grouped with consumer advocates, and in two RTOs the
end user’s sector includes environmental organizations. Second, the
interests of a single entity can extend across several sectors. Consumerowned utilities provide an example of participant interests extending
across established sectors. Most municipal and cooperative utilities
operate through tiered institutional relationships with larger co
operatives or joint action agencies providing services such as trans
mission, generation, and power marketing for distribution cooperatives.
In PJM, these interdependent businesses are represented within and
across different sectors, with the electric distributors’ sector including
distribution cooperatives and several generation and transmission co
operatives, and the power marketing sector includes large cooperatives
that engage in supplier transactions to support distribution
cooperatives.
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Table 5
Summary of RTO governance comparison.
Stronger State and More Informal
Stakeholder Power

Moderate State and Moderate Stakeholder
Power

Weaker State and More Formal Stakeholder Power

CAISO

ERCOT

MISO

SPP

ISO-NE

NYISO

PJM

Restructuring:
resource adequacy/
retail choice
Number of sectors
Voting weight/
participant share:
transmission & gen.b
Accessc

Stateregulated/
Partial choice
NA
Open selfselection

State-regulated/
Choice

Voluntary mkt./No
choice

Multi-state/No choice

Mandatory mkt./
Choice

Mandatory
mkt./Choice

Mandatory mkt./
Choice

7
27%/10%
2.6

10a
28%/43%
0.9

10
50%/48%
1.2

6
33%/7%
4.9

5
42%/25%
1.7

5
40%/26%
1.6

Open

Open

Open

Open

Closed to nonmembers

Agenda setting

Any
stakeholder

Any stakeholder

Any stakeholder

Members

Closed board/Open
members
committee
Committees

Information rulesd

Publicly
available
None

Publicly available

Publicly available

Staff, members,
states, or market
participants
Publicly available

Closed board/
Members-only
committee
Staff, members, or
states

Representative/
Supermajority
Advisory
Statutory

Representative/
Simple Majority
Advisory
Delegated

Representative/
Supermajority
Advisory
Delegated

Board info.
Unavailable
Plenary/
Supermajority
Competing
Advisory

Publicly
available
Plenary/
Supermajority
Consensus
Advisory

Board info.
Unavailable
Plenary/
Supermajority
Divided
Advisory

Committee structure/
voting thresholde
Stakeholder authority
State authority

Emergent
Statutory

a

MISO is reconsidering its stakeholder structure and has an affiliate sector in place during this process.
Shares and ratio of transmission and generation owners and developers voting weight and number of participants as a share of the total number of participants.
c
Boards and committees retain authority to meet in executive session. ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM meet with members in non-decisional liaison committee meetings.
d
Board and members committee minutes, materials, written comments, and individual or pass/fail votes posted publicly. ISO-NE and PJM make summaries of board
meeting minutes available, and PJM makes written comments to the board available.
e
NYISO decisions require a supermajority of 58%. All other supermajority thresholds are 66%.
b

Fig. 6. Types of organizations within the enduse sector by regional transmission organ
izationa,b. a. Environmental nonprofits are
included in the end-use sector for ISO-NE and
ERCOT. In comparison, they are included with
consumer-owned utilities in NYISO and are repre
sented by separate sectors in SPP and MISO. In
PJM, environmental interests are represented in a
user group with consumer advocates. This group
can make proposals but does not have voting rights
or other sector responsibilities. b. CAISO is not
included because the sector is formed specifically
and only for the nomination of board members.
Sources: Appendix B.

5.2.3. Dominant ideas and participant empowerment
This section examines how norms and dominant ideas shape
participant behaviors, as well as, how the communication and collective
decisions of stakeholders affect policy and outcomes [26,64]. Most rule
or practice changes proposed through RTO decision-making processes
are made through tariff amendments filed under §205 of the Federal
Power Act and FERC tends to be deferential to RTO decision-making
processes. If FERC decides of its own accord, or in response to stake
holder petitions, that existing rules are “unjust and unreasonable” it can
initiate a proceeding under §206, but this proactive authority has a
higher burden of proof and is used sparingly. Additionally, a dominant
idea that shapes market and operating practices is that RTOs should be
technology-neutral and designed to create a level playing field for all
market participants. In this regard, RTOs are often viewed as organi
zations that implement, rather than form policy. This section describes
the relative influence of stakeholders, boards, and state regulators over
the §205 filings that translate RTO collective decision into formal
administrative policy approved in formal FERC regulatory proceedings.

Stakeholder authority is informal in most RTOs and derives from the
ability for advice and consultation to influence other stakeholders, staff,
and board members. The RTO board is vested with formal authority to
file tariff changes and stakeholders provide advisory recommendations
that are organized through voting reports or written and oral com
ments.4 Among these RTOs, the extent of authority exercised by the
board varies. For example, in SPP, members meet concurrently with the
board and conduct an advisory vote before the board rules on a proposal.
However, unless there is an appeal, proposals approved by a lower-level
standing committee are filed without review by the members committee
or board, thus empowering members, rather than the board, with direct
authority over many decisions. In comparison, stakeholder authority is
more formal in the northeastern RTOs and derived through governing
documents establishing the relationship between the members and the

4
ERCOT is not subject to FERC jurisdiction. All tariff changes are filed with
and ruled on by the state public utility commission.
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6. Discussion
This review characterizes RTO governance in terms of structure and
participatory decision-making processes. RTO governance in the United
States follows a tiered governance structure with an independent board
and committees or other venues for stakeholder engagement. Most RTOs
have membership eligibility requirements and differentiate between
market participants, members, and other stakeholders. All RTOs engage
with civil society, environmental, and state entities, but the structures
and sources of influence in these interactions vary greatly across regions.
These variations in RTO governance are compared across the di
mensions of participation and access, collective decision-making scope
and practices, and dominant ideas and participant empowerment.
Participation in RTO decision-making is largely shaped by mem
bership requirements and sector definitions. The number and size of
sectors vary widely across the regions. To some extent, this reflects
differences in regulatory and policy contexts and related differences in
the most common business models, technologies, or community and
environmental interests seeking to participate. The Midwest RTOs have
more sectors and the number of members in each sector is more evenly
distributed than in the northeastern RTOs. Moreover, there are differ
ences across RTOs in terms of public access, with the northeastern RTOs
restricting access to the highest-level board and member decisionmaking meetings.
Communication among stakeholders, RTO staff, and the board oc
curs in many formal and informal venues. In most RTOs, members play
an active role in setting the agenda, prioritizing issues, making com
mittee assignments, and otherwise shaping the scope of decision mak
ing. Yet, RTO staff are also important in making these decisions. These
communication practices support collective decisions reached, for the
most part, through sector-weighted voting. The sector weights are
designed to redistribute the balance of power relatively equally across
sectors. With this sector-weighting, stakeholders in a large heteroge
neous sector will have relatively less voting power than stakeholders in a
small homogeneous sector. Information regarding recommendations,
deliberations, and voting actions within these decision-making pro
cesses is generally available to the public but somewhat restricted in the
northeastern RTOs.
Importantly, the interactions between RTOs and states are compli
cated by the dominance of economic principles requiring technologyneutral market design and state policy goals to promote specific re
sources or technologies. Stakeholder power to influence RTO decisions
is both informal and formal. Stakeholder authority is more informal in
RTOs that also have more formal state regulatory and policy authority.
In most RTOs, stakeholder recommendations are advisory to the board,
and influence is informal. In these regions, states have retained or
negotiated delegation of authority over resource adequacy and trans
mission planning and have relatively stronger organizational structures
to coordinate interactions. In comparison, stakeholders in the north
eastern RTOs have formal authority to proposed rule changes to FERC.
In these regions, states seek to influence processes through informal
interactions but lack direct authority over capacity and transmission
planning processes or integrated organizational structures.

Fig. 7. Weighted-voting allocation by generalized sector category in each
regional transmission organizationa,b. a. Within the seven sector categories,
individual sectors are identified as separate segments and by percentage. Blue
shades represent supplier interests. Tan shades represent sectors with mixed
interests. Green shades represent consumer interests. b. SPP uses transmissionowning vs. transmission-using before issues reach the concurrent board and
members meeting. In the concurrent meetings, votes are based on 11 sectors
and weighted. c. CAISO only used sectors in the board member nomination
process. *Represents the allocation once the alternative resources sector is fully
active. Sources: Appendix B. (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

board. The ISO-NE board is required to file any proposal receiving
support from 60% or more of the members, but it may also file a
competing proposal. NYISO’s self-described shared governance approach
requires a consensus between the board and members, whereas, in PJM
authority is divided between the board and members, with members
allocated authority over operating issues (row 8, Table 5).
State regulatory and policy authority in RTO governance is most
direct in the single-state RTOs established through state statute, specif
ically CAISO and ERCOT. The state authorities in California and Texas
appoint or approve board members, retain control over resource ade
quacy planning, and often encourage the RTOs to coordinate with other
state agencies. In contrast, NYISO is not established in state statute. The
state does not have direct authority regarding board positions or plan
ning for future resource needs. Instead, state officials are non-voting
participants in stakeholder and board meetings and NYISO has been
delegated authority to maintain resource adequacy, which it does
through a mandatory capacity market.
The multi-state RTOs each have an entity to coordinate state in
terests, yet these entities differ in authority and power. The regional
states entities for the Midwest RTOs are structurally integrated into
governance processes and have delegated authority over transmission
cost allocation and resource adequacy. MISO states participate in
stakeholder processes through a separate sector and the Organization of
MISO States sets resource adequacy targets thus, making the capacity
market voluntary. The SPP Regional States Committee is authorized to
provide direction and input on all issues of concern to states, coordinates
the development of regional resource adequacy reserve margins, and
regularly participates in strategic initiatives. In contrast, the regional
states entities for ISO-NE and PJM have no direct authority over filings
with FERC and do not vote in member processes. These entities are
separate organizations that exert influence through communication
with the boards and members (row 9, Table 5).

6.1. Strengthening RTO governance
This review identifies variations across RTO governance design in
dimensions that are important for public interest accountability
including open participation, access to process and information, the
balance of power, and interactions with state and community organi
zations. This assessment suggests several opportunities for strength
ening RTO governance. Bolstering institutional design could involve
periodic investigation and public reporting on the heterogeneity of in
terests within existing sector definitions. Although a diversity of in
terests within sectors is likely unavoidable, currently some of the largest
sectors are those with heterogeneous interests. To the extent RTO
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stakeholders have changed over time, the existing sector designations
may no longer adequately demonstrate RTO governance independence
or effectively engage a broad range of interests. Smaller and more
numerous sectors are likely to have more homogeneous interests,
allowing these sectors to represent participating and non-participating
stakeholders more effectively. More homogeneous sectors also
contribute to transparency. Also, sector definitions may encourage or
discourage certain stakeholders from participating in RTO processes
either actively through provisions that rule out participation or
passively by requiring participation in a sector with misaligned interests.
Based on periodic evaluations of sector interests, RTOs or FERC could
recommend revisions to sector definitions.
The necessity to innovate new market and planning designs to
accommodate rapidly evolving technologies and uncertain climate
events suggests that open access, information sharing, and venues that
encourage dialogue among stakeholders may be valuable for organiza
tional learning and the effectiveness of outcomes. Several of the prac
tices identified in this review provided proven examples of approaches
that could increase transparency and dialogue in RTO governance.
Along these lines, strengthening institutional design could also involve
investigation into when and why taskforces and workgroups are created
and how participants are recruited for participation in these venues that
are often critical for open dialogue and innovation.
More attention could also be directed toward the interactions be
tween stakeholders and RTO staff in defining the scope and pace of
decision-making. The issues that are prioritized within stakeholder
engagement process have important implications for the pace and
timing of rule changes, related shifts in investments, and progress to
ward community and policy goals. Across regions, the scope of board
authority over proposed rule changes varies, yet perhaps the most
important role for boards is providing strategic direction and oversight
to staff who are critical in agenda setting, sharing information, and
creating new venues for discussion.
Finally, many of the most prominent controversies involving RTOs
relate to the institutional relationships between RTOs and state au
thorities. This review identifies a range of RTO designs for interfacing
with states and suggests possibilities for improving these institutional
relationships. The Organization of MISO States has been credited with
building the technical capacity of state commission staff and has suc
cessfully forged regional agreements for transmission planning [75,76].
The SPP Regional States Committee has been described as working
cooperatively with the board to develop policies with broad stakeholder
support [77]. Regional organizations of states that lack formal authority,
could draw on practices in other regions to suggest process reforms or
substantive reallocation of responsibilities. However, building strong
institutional relationships is difficult and may require a new vision of
roles and responsibilities. The literature suggests an important role for
state and federal regulators in strengthening the public interest
accountability of these governance arrangement through boundary
spanning functions [14].

preferences. This literature thus suggests that differentiating venues and
processes across substantive market and planning issues could be
beneficial.
The design of weighted voting systems is complex and there is no
single preferred approach [78]. Voting systems can be designed for
different purposes, such as efficiency or equity. Within RTO stakeholder
engagement process, the combination of sector definition, number of
members in each sector, sector weights, and voting thresholds matter.
Building on [71], which provides evidence that voting rules can have a
measurable impact on outcomes, this review paper suggests that the
differences in voting rules across RTOs could have differential impacts
on outcomes across regions.
These case studies of RTO governance also offer insights for under
standing interactive governance. They represent unique cases of
participatory institutional design in a highly technical setting involving
new and old industry actors and a growing number of public and civil
society actors. This review contributes to a growing body of research on
the ways power shapes interactive governance arrangements and the
accountability of such arrangements to the public interest. Specifically,
this study contributes to earlier frameworks for understanding partici
patory governance by identifying the categories for grouping stake
holder interests and the complexity and interactions across multiple
communication and decision-making venues as important for under
standing the outcomes of interactive governance. Furthermore, these
cases also complicate the traditional view that state authorities can
temper industry interests and illustrate the complexity of multi-state
arrangements.
6.3. Limitations and further research
This research is intended to provide a review of existing practices and
a foundation for further research. As such, it is limited by drawing
exclusively on documents, rather than also collecting data from RTO
participants. It also does not explore the many current issues related to
RTO governance or how institutional designs work in practice. This is a
particular limitation for understanding how power dynamics shape
interactive governance. Further research is needed to examine informal
authority, the dynamics of actor relationships, the exercise of power,
and the role of boundary spanning within participatory governance
structures. Additional research could also examine the extent to which
members actively participate in processes, strategic decisions about how
and when to engage, and the use of informal influence by state actors.
Research into the legal and economic implications of altering authority
over certain market features such as resource adequacy could also
contribute to a better understanding of available institutional design
choices.
7. Conclusion
RTOs are tasked with responding to the ongoing challenges of
evolving technologies within a context that crosses traditional jurisdic
tional boundaries and involves new and diverse community and policy
priorities. As such, RTO institutional designs are complex relative to
many other forms of interactive governance. Findings from this review
of seven RTOs in the United States reveal important variations in
participation and power dimensions across RTOs. A comparative
assessment of public interest accountability across RTO institutional
designs identifies three common governance forms based on the relative
influence of state agencies and stakeholders, as well as several partici
patory and power dimensions.
The structures and participation practices established to enable
regulatory restructuring and economic efficiencies are not necessarily
suited to the current challenges of innovating new market, operating,
and planning approaches for the future grid. Governance and stake
holder arrangements can and should be designed to address democratic
problems within specific contexts. Today, interests are more

6.2. Implications for theory and practice
Examining RTO practices using a participatory democracy perspec
tive can improve institutional design and evaluation by directing
attention to specific dimensions of participation and power. This lens
emphasizes that choices about governance are strategic decisions with
real-world impacts on administrative policy, market outcomes, and
communities. Identifying barriers to participation, examining how
different actors exercise power, and systematically assessing the ratio
nale and purposes for various design choices can suggest ways to
improve governance effectiveness, legitimacy, or fairness. This litera
ture also indicates that there are likely tradeoffs in design choices. Some
designs will be better able to engage diverse actors in open dialogue to
innovate effective solutions and other designs will be more suited to
engaging a broad range of perspectives and identifying existing
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heterogeneous making traditional sectors less relevant, and the necessity
for innovation suggests a need for venues that enable dialogue among
stakeholders that understand the capabilities and constraints of new
technologies, as well as the preferences of consumers and communities.
Increasing attention to the political and economic consequences of en
ergy decisions heightens the need for access and transparency of deci
sion-making.
This form of interactive governance that spans the responsibility of
more than one organization is increasingly common but also associated
with challenges in providing public interest accountability. Using an
institutional design approach, this study offers several opportunities for
strengthening RTO governance and areas for further research. However,
governance design in complex and dynamic systems is an ongoing
challenge that will require organizational resilience in response to new
challenges and adaptation as energy systems evolve.
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Appendix A. RTO governance context and structures
CAISO

ERCOT

CONTEXT AND MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
States Served1
Single state
Single state (~90% of
(all or part)
(~80% of CA
TX; not
and small part of
synchronously
NV)
interconnected)
a
Interconnect
Western
Texas
Western
Texas Reliability
Electric
Electricity
Entity
Reliability
Coordinating
Organizationb
Council
Transmission
20
5
Owners
Members/
16%
19%
Market
Participantsc
Size in People
~32 million
~ 26 million
Servedd
Capacity Market
State Resource
Not Required
Adequacy Plan
Design e
Dominant Retail
Partial Retail
Retail Choice
Choice (CCAs)
Restructuring
Statusf
States with Clean
100% Clean
Previous RPS for
Energy Policy7
Energy Standard
2015
by 2045
Origin

Date of Market
Operation
Internal Revenue
Code Type

State legislation
AB1890 (1998)not a power pool
legacy
1998

Texas
Interconnection
System (1941);
ERCOT (1970)
2001

501(c) (3) public
benefits

501(c) (4) social
welfare not-for-profit

ISO-NE

MISO

NYISO

PJM

SPP

Six states

All or parts of 15
states and one
province

Single state

All or parts of 13
states and DC

14 states

Eastern
Northeast Power
Coordinating
Council

Eastern
Midwest
Reliability
Organization

Eastern
Northeast Power
Coordinating Council

Eastern
Reliability First

Eastern
Midwest
Reliability
Organization

30

52

6

52

29

54%

84%

21%

48%

28%

~14.8 million

~42 million

~19.8 million

~ 65 million

~18 million

Mandatory

Voluntary

Mandatory

Mandatory

Retail Choice
(except VT)

No Retail Choice
(except IL and MI
partial)
4 of 15 states MN
= 26.5% RPS by
2025

Retail Choice

Retail Choice
(except KY, NC,
WV, and VA partial)
9 of 13 states DC =
100% RPS by 2032
MD and NJ 50% by
203

Regional States
Committee Plan
No Retail Choice

Not a power pool
legacy

New York Power
Pool (1965)

PJM Power Pool
(1927)

Southwest Power
Pool (1941)

1997

2005

1999

1998

2004

501(c) (3) public
benefits

501(c) (4) social
welfare not-forprofit

501(c) (3) public
benefits

501(c); described as
profit neutral

501(c) (6)
business league

Delegated (Board
and States)

Consensus (Board,
Members)

Delegated (Board
and States)

Independent CEO
non-voting

Independent CEO
non-voting

Independent CEO
voting

Consensus (Board,
Members, Trans.
Owners)
Independent CEO
non-voting

Board Selected

Member Selected

Board Selected

Member Selected

Member Selected

External – Potomac
Economics

External –
Potomac
Economics

External – Potomac
Economics

External –
Monitoring
Analytics

Internal staff

Closed board
meetings w/written

Open board
meetings

Board meetings only
open to members

Closed board
meetings w/written

Meet
concurrently with

6 of 6 states ME =
100% RPS by 2050
MA 80% Clean
Energy Standard by
2050
New England
Power Pool (1971)

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN DIMENSIONS: FILING RIGHTS AND BOARD
§205 Filing
Retained
NA
Competing (Board
Rights
and Members)
Board
Membership

Independent
CEO not on
board

Board Selection

Appointed

Market Monitor

Internal staff
and threemember
committee
Open board
meetings Live

Hybrid CEO not on
board State
regulatory chair nonvoting
Member Selected
partial state approval
External – Potomac
Economics

100% Clean Energy
Standard by 2040

2 of 14 states NM
= 100% Clean
Energy Standard
by 2045

Independent CEO
voting

(continued on next page)
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(continued )
Stakeholder/
Board
Interactions

CAISO

ERCOT

ISO-NE

MISO

NYISO

PJM

SPP

and archived
webcasts

Open board meetings
Live and archived
webcasts

communication Biannual meetings;
Liaison Committee

Rotating location
and webcast

Liaison committee ~
monthly

communication
Liaison committee
4–5 times a year

members
committee and
w/members at
least three times a
year

Hierarchical

Siloed

Hierarchical

Horizontal

Sector-based w/
entrance and
annual fees

Sector-based with
scaled annual fees

Sector-based w/
entrance and
annual fees

Representative
member
committee
Advisory sectorweighted voting
in members and
states committee
Simple Majority
(50%)

Plenary member
committee

Plenary member
committee

Sector-weighted
voting in senior
committees
Supermajority (58%)

Sector-weighted
voting in senior
committees:
present, review,
vote
Supermajority
(66%)

Sector-based w/
annual fee and
waivers; Exit fee
in revision
Representative
member
committee
Advisory voting
through
transmission
owning vs. using
groups and
sectors
Supermajority
(66%)
Draft proposals,
develop
positions, provide
input through a
straw vote

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN DIMENSIONS:
Organizational
Flat
Structure
Participant
Open selfSelection
selection

STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
Flat
Interorganizational
Sector-based with
Sector-based w/
scaled annual fees
annual fees

Position Rules

No membership

Representative
member committee

Plenary member
committee

Communication
and Decision
Rules

Written and oral
expression of
preferences and
priorities
No formal
aggregation of
preferences

Sector-weighted and
participatory voting
in senior committee
Supermajority (66%)
and majority of
seated

Sector-weighted
voting
Supermajority
(66%)

Scope Rules: Role
of Staff

Modify staff
straw-proposals

Develop positions,
propose tariff
changes, and take
budget actions

Present “hot
topic” issues and
advise board

Develop positions,
supervise
committees, and
prepare budget
recommendations

Develop positions,
advise on
operations,
markets, and ensure
a balance of
interests

Prioritization of
Issues and
Initiation of
Revisions

Annual ranking
of priorities
New initiatives
structured by
staff

Develop studies and
plans, supervise
subcommittees, make
expenditure
recommendations,
and take certain
actions

Changes initiated
by ISO or members;
members can offer
amendments or
alternatives
NESCOE can make
proposals for
changes through
the participant’s
process
Only voting
members can make
a motion

Annual priorities
cascade down
committee
structure and
revisited midyear
New issues can be
initiated by
board, staff,
stakeholder
entities, or
individual
stakeholders

Items shall be added
to the agenda upon a
request to the
Chairperson by any
five representatives
and/or by
representatives
constituting the
majority of any one
Sector, upon 10
business days
advance notice
before the
Management
Committee meeting

Change requests
prioritized
quarterly
Revisions
initiated by
members, market
participants, staff,
or jurisdictional
government
authority

Access to Board/
Committee
Discussions

Board and
initiative
meetings open
to public
participation

Board and members
committee meetings
open to public
participation
Member, market
participant, or
government staff can
appeal or recommend
opposition to
members committee
action
Any member may
attend members
committee
subcommittees

Board and
members
committee
meetings open to
public
participation
(exception for
individual sector
meetings)

Information
Available

Board meeting
notice, minutes,
materials,
written
comments, and
individual board
member votes
posted publicly
Initiatives
meeting
presentations,

Board and members
committee meeting
notice, minutes,
materials, written
comments, and
individual or voice
votes posted publicly
Archived webcasts of
board and members
committee meetings

Only participants of
NEPOOL or invited
guests can attend
and speak at
committee
Board meets twice a
year with
participants
committee or as
needed; board at
sole discretion may
also invite one or
more participant to
attend board
meetings provided
other participants
invited to another
meeting
NEPOOL members
committee
meetings are not
public; open to
guests if cleared by
committee chair;
notice, meeting
materials, minutes
are posted publicly
Votes recorded by
sector and

PSC and FERC may
attend, but not vote,
at board and
members committee
meetings
Public may only
attend committee
meetings in person
and cannot
participate; guests
may participate with
consent of Chair
Committees open to
non-voting members
Board meets with
Liaison Committee
and members (MC)
can attend
Board meeting
notice, minutes,
materials and pass/
fail votes recorded
and posted publicly
Notice, minutes,
materials, and pass/
fail votes for the
members committee
to members and/or
public is at discretion

Standing
committee develops
annual
prioritization of
activities (MRC);
Initial decision to
take up and define
boundaries made
by standing
committee; these
committees act as
“gatekeepers”
Members, nonmembers,
regulators, and staff
can initiate issues
Closed; any written
communication
will be shared with
full Board and all
members; twice a
year general
sessions provide an
open forum for
dialogue on strictly
informational
issues (nondecision-making)

Agenda, minutes,
and meeting
materials only
available to Board;
All stakeholders
have the
opportunity to
provide written
communication to
board and this
communication is

Board meeting
notice, minutes,
materials and
pass/fail votes
recorded and
posted publicly

Board and
committee
meeting notice,
minutes,
materials, and
individual or
voice votes
posted publicly

Board and
members
committee
meetings are
concurrent and
include a
representative of
the RSC; open
meeting
Quarterly joint
stakeholder
meetings

(continued on next page)
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(continued )
CAISO

ERCOT

materials, and
comments
posted publicly
Archived
webcasts of
board meetings
and other
meetings
Public and Civil
Society

Not recruited or
incentivized
Within
governance
structures

ISO-NE

MISO

individually
Meeting materials
may not be shared
publicly and
attendees may not
reveal the identity
or affiliation of
participants
Within consumer
sector

Within consumer
sector
Consumer Liaison
Group for purposes
of sharing
information and
views

Three sectors:
Environmental
and Other, Public
Consumers, State
Regulators
Within
governance
structures

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN DIMENSIONS: RETAIL REGULATION AND STATE/LOCAL POLICY
Structure
Board
PUC and legislative
Separate
Organization of
appointments
oversight
organizations for
regulators
and
regulators and
coordination
policymakers;
with state
NEPOOL shall
agencies
consult and
coordinate from
time to time with
state regulatory and
other authorities
Authority
Governor
Board participation
Non-voting
Voting and
appointment of
as non-voting
participation in
participation in
board
member
plenary committee.
committees and
Approval of
NESCO established
subcommittees
independent board
for participation in
Authority
members
two areas: resource
includes §205
adequacy and
filings for
system planning
transmission cost
and expansion –
allocation;
specifically
Individual states
required to provide
retain authority
feedback on
for resource
installed capacity
adequacy
requirement
Decision Rules

NA

NA

Funding

External

External

NESCO – Numeric
majority and
weight majority by
electric load
Funded through
tariff

NYISO

PJM

of the chair
(currently available
to public)

posted publicly
Meeting notes,
audio, video shall
not be shared with
the general public
and outside of MC
and MRC,
participants shall
not be quoted
without permission,
A non-voting user
group can put
motions before
committees and
board
User groups are
self-formed by
members; meetings
are open

Public power and
environmental sector
Environmental
Advisory Council and
Consumer Interest
Liaison provide
expertise to
stakeholders, board
(CIL), and
management (EAC)
on specific issues

SPP

Alternative power
and public
interest sector
Within
governance
structures

PUC oversight

Organization of
regulators

Committee of
regulators

Non-voting
participation in
senior committees
Role in public policy
transmission projects

Non-voting
participation and
annual meeting
with board;
individual states
are not bound by a
vote or resolution
from the state
regulatory body
Role in public
policy transmission
projects

OMS – Consensus

NA

OPSI – Majority
with identified
supporters

Annual meeting
with board and
quarterly
stakeholder
briefings
Authority
includes §205
rights for
transmission cost
allocation,
certain aspects of
transmission
planning, and
resource
adequacy
RSC – Majority
with identified
supporters

Funded through
budget

External

Funded through
tariff

Funded through
budget

Sources:
FERC, RTOs and ISOs https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/electric/power-sales-and-markets/rtos-and-isos
North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2020. 2020 Summer Reliability Assessment.
North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2019. 2019–2020 Winter Reliability Assessment.
CAISO, http://www.caiso.com/about/Pages/OurBusiness/How-power-flows-in-California.aspx
ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/about/profile; http://www.ercot.com/news/mediakit/backgrounder
ISO-NE, https://www.iso-ne.com/about/key-stats/; https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/history/
MISO, https://cdn.misoenergy.org/Corporate%20Fact%20Sheet147649.pdf
NYSIO, https://www.nyiso.com/
PJM, https://www.pjm.com/~/media/about-pjm/newsroom/fact-sheets/pjm-at-a-glance.ashx; https://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/
pjm-history.aspx
SPP, https://www.spp.org/about-us/; https://spp.org/about-us/#:~:text = In%201968%2C%20SPP%20joined%2012,Regional%20Trans
mission%20Organization%20in%202004
CAISO, 2019. Annual Report on Market Issues and Performance.
ERCOT, ISO-NE, MISO, NYISO, PJM, and SPP. 2019. State of the Market Reports.
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), February 2020; 2018 Renewable Energy Grid Integration Data Book; DOE/GO-102020–5208
DSIRE, https://www.dsireusa.org/resources/detailed-summary-maps/
US EIA, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/
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CAISO, Board Selection Policy, Version #4.6
CAISO, Open Meeting Policy, Version #3.8
CAISO, Records Availability Policy, Version #4.6
CAISO, 2015, Amended & Restated Bylaws of California Independent System Operator Corporation, a California nonprofit public benefit cor
poration, Version 8.0; 12/18/15
ERCOT, 2017, Leady. Committee Education on ERCOT Membership
ERCOT, 2021, Stakeholder Process Overview
ERCOT, 2020, Amended and Restated Bylaws of Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (A Texas Non-Stock, Non-Profit Corporation); 7/31/20
ERCOT, 2019, Board Policies and Procedures; 4/9/19
ERCOT, 2020, Fact Sheet, 6/20; 2017, Quick Facts, 1/17/17
ISO-NE, 2019, By-Laws of ISO New England, Inc. Amended 5/21/19
NESCO, 2019, Annual Report
ISO-NE, 2009, Consumer Liaison Group; 12/29/09
ISO-NE, 2011, Participants Agreement among ISO New England, Inc. as the Regional Transmission Organization for New England and the New
England Power Pool, and the entities that are from time to time parties hereto constituting the Individual Participants
NEPOOL, 2017, New England Power Pool Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement, 4/7/17
NESCO,2007, Memorandum of Understanding Among ISO New England, Inc., the New England Power Pool, and New England States Committee
on Electricity
NEPOOL, 2018, New England Power Pool Technical Committee Bylaws, 6/26/18
MISO, 2017, Principles of Corporate Governance, Board of Directors
MISO, 2019, Stakeholder Governance Guide, 12/11/19
MISO, 2005, Advisory Process – Role of State Commission Representatives
MISO, 2020, Corporate Information
MISO, 2017, Bylaws of the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, 2/27/17
MISO, 2018, Agreement of the Transmission Facilities Owners to Organize the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, 3/2/18
MISO, 2003, Organization of MISO States Inc., OMS Funding Agreement
NYISO, 2013, NYISO Agreements, New York Independent System Operator, Inc. 3/5/13
NYISO, 2013, Bylaws of the Management Committee, 3/27/13
NYISO, 2003, Bylaws of the Operating Committee, 8/14/03
NYISO Governance: Frequently Asked Questions
NYISO, 2020, Craan, Market Overview Introduction; 6/23/20
PJM, 2021, PJM Manual 34: PJM Stakeholder Process, Revision 10; 1/27/21
PJM, 2011, Amended and Restated Operating Agreement, 7/14/11
PJM, 2020, Board of Managers Code of Conduct, 3/20
PJM, 2020, Board of Managers Fact Sheet, 4/10/20
PJM, 2013, Organization of PJM States, By-Laws
SPP, 2019, Governing Documents Tariff, 10/8/19
SPP, 2018, Markets and Operations Policy Committee Organizational Group Scope Statement, 12/3/18
SPP, 2019, The History of the Regional State Committee for the Southwest Power Pool, Inc.; Hinton; 4/29/19
Appendix B. . RTO sectors and member detail
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CAISO Source: CAISO Board Selection Policy 11/2/18* Currently under revision. https://www.caiso.com/Documents/BoardSelectionPolicy.pdf
ERCOT Source: 2020ERCOT Members for WCM. http://www.ercot.com/about/governance/members
ISO-NE Source: NEPOOL Customer Directory by Section 1/14/20. https://www.iso-ne.com/participate/participant-asset-listings/directory/
MISO Source: Membership Listing by Stakeholder Group 6/20. https://www.misoenergy.org/stakeholder-engagement/members/
NYISO Source: 2020 Parties to the ISO Agreement. https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/1408883/2020-Committee-Membership-Roster.
pdf/ccd010ca-dc76-70c5-e698-938578d261cd?t = 1590767911360
SPP Source: Members and Market Participants accessed 6/14/20. https://www.spp.org/about-us/members-market-participants/
PJM Source: PJM Membership as of 6/14/20.
Appendix C. . ISO-New England governance structures

Dashed lines indicate structures that can be established ad hoc. Figure shows the current count of working groups and subcommittees.
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